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CONCLUSION: THE POLITICAL THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
REBECCA E. ZIETLOW∗
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States Supreme Court has done little to develop the 
meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment.  One could conclude from 
the Court’s lack of development that the Amendment is irrelevant, 
unimportant, or even limited to remedying the historical circums-
tances surrounding its adoption by ending chattel slavery.  It would, 
however, be a grave mistake to interpret the lack of judicial doctrine 
as a lack of constitutional meaning.  Congress has played the principal 
role in determining the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
promise of freedom.  Moreover, the framers of the Thirteenth 
Amendment never anticipated that the Court would define its mean-
ing.  Instead, they expected the political branches to enforce the 
Amendment responding to the influence of constitutional politics.  As 
Michael Les Benedict explains, “From the era of the American Revo-
lution at least through the era of Reconstruction, all politics were 
constitutional politics.”1  The political Thirteenth Amendment man-
dates that both its interpretation and its enforcement occur primarily 
through constitutional politics, not constitutional law.2
One of the underlying themes of this symposium is the relation-
ship between politics and the Thirteenth Amendment.  This Essay ex-
plores that theme and this symposium’s contributions to our under-
standing of the political Thirteenth Amendment.  It raises the issue of 
the relationship between constitutional politics and constitutional law.  
Participants in political movements engage in constitutional politics 
in an attempt to influence constitutional law.  With respect to the 
   
 
Copyright © 2011 by Rebecca E. Zietlow. 
∗ Charles W. Fornoff Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo College of 
Law.  Thanks so much to all of the participants in this fascinating symposium for enligh-
tening me and sharing their views.  Thanks to Mark Graber for organizing the 2011 Mary-
land Constitutional Law Schmooze, and to the students at the Maryland Law Review for 
publishing these papers and thus preserving the symposium for posterity. 
 1. Michael Les Benedict, Constitutional Politics, Constitutional Law, and the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 71 MD. L. REV. 163, 169 (2011). 
 2. For the purpose of this paper, “constitutional politics” refers to constitutional ad-
vocacy within the political realm, and “constitutional law” refers to the jurisprudence of 
the courts that interpret the Constitution. 
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Thirteenth Amendment, these activists have often succeeded.  The re-
sult of their success is a series of sporadic but significant federal sta-
tutes protecting workers from involuntary servitude and racial minori-
ties from the badges and incidents of slavery.3
II.  SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE FRAMERS 
  To understand the role 
the Thirteenth Amendment plays in our system of constitutional law, 
then, it is essential to understand the constitutional politics of that 
Amendment—to explore the political Thirteenth Amendment. 
As Michael Les Benedict reminds us, the framers of the Thir-
teenth Amendment simply did not believe that the Court had hege-
mony over constitutional meaning.4  According to Benedict, the Re-
construction Era was a time “in which politics and political choices 
were predominantly articulated in constitutional terms.”5  Constitu-
tional debates were conducted primarily not in the courts but in the 
halls of Congress.6  Moreover, to put it mildly, the members of the 
Reconstruction Congress did not have a favorable impression of judi-
cial review.  Because of the Dred Scott decision,7 members of the Re-
construction Congress saw the Supreme Court as an instrument to 
protect the institution of slavery.8  After all, in Dred Scott, the Court 
held that slave owners had a constitutional right to own slaves.9  The 
Thirteenth Amendment overruled that aspect of Dred Scott and trans-
formed a pro-slavery constitution into one which promotes a broad 
vision of freedom.10
 
 3. These statutes include the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Slave Kidnapping Statute, 
and the Anti-Peonage Act, all of which will be discussed infra.  See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free 
at Last! Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 90 B.U. L. REV. 255, 279–311 
(2010) [hereinafter Zietlow, Free at Last!] (describing the congressional debates over sta-
tutes enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment). 
  It’s not surprising that the framers of the Thir-
teenth Amendment did not expect the Court to play the leading role 
 4. Benedict, supra note 1, at 164. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 165. 
 7. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (overruled by the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments). 
 8. REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND 
THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 47–48 (2006) [hereinafter ZIETLOW, ENFORCING 
EQUALITY].  
 9. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 452 (“[I]t is the opinion of the court that the act of Con-
gress which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of this kind [a slave] in 
the territory of the United States . . . is not warranted by the Constitution . . . .”). 
 10. See Benedict, supra note 1, at 181 (“In place of a constitutional order that exalted 
the property rights of slaveowners, the Amendment would re-establish a constitutional or-
der dedicated to freedom.”). 
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in defining its meaning.  The members of the Reconstruction Con-
gress played that role themselves, and empowered members of future 
Congresses to do the same with Section 2 of that Amendment.11
Immediately after the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified, 
members of Congress began the debate over the first piece of legisla-
tion enforcing the Amendment—what became the 1866 Civil Rights 
Act.
   
12  Introduced by the well-respected lawyer Lyman Trumbull, the 
Act provided that all persons born within the United States were citi-
zens, and would enjoy the same right “to make and enforce contracts, 
to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, 
hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal 
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and 
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.”13  This broad language re-
flects the prevailing view in the Reconstruction Congress that free-
dom itself entitled a person to the protection of fundamental human 
rights.14  Other statutes, including the 1866 Slave Kidnapping Act15 
and the 1867 Anti-Peonage Act,16 protected workers from being sub-
jected to undue coercion.  The most far-reaching Reconstruction Era 
statute, the 1871 Enforcement Act,17 which imposed civil and criminal 
penalties on state actors who violated the federal rights of any per-
son,18 and on private actors who engaged in conspiracies to prevent a 
person from exercising “any right or privilege of a citizen of the Unit-
ed States,”19 was based in part on Congress’s power under Section 2.20
 
 11. Section 2 reads: “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.  
   
 12. See Zietlow, Free at Last!, supra note 3, at 277–79 (describing the theory of the Thir-
teenth Amendment which the Reconstruction Congress adopted in drafting the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866). 
 13. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1981–1982 (2006)). 
 14. See Zietlow, Free at Last!, supra note 3, at 279. 
 15. Slave Kidnapping Statute, ch. 86, 14 Stat. 50 (1866) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 443 (2006)). This statute overruled the Fugitive Slave Laws.  
 16. Anti-Peonage Act, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1581 and 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2006)).  The Anti-Peonage Act abolished the “slavery-like” 
practice of peonage. 
 17. Enforcement Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, 13–15 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 18 U.S.C.A. and 42 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 18. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (stating that any person who deprives a citizen of the United 
States of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding 
for redress . . . .”). 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 
 20. Some members of Congress also argued that it also fell within their authority to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Zietlow, Free at Last!, supra note 3, at 287 (quot-
ing Reconstruction Era congressmen defending the constitutionality of the 1871 Enforce-
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Legislative activism in the Reconstruction Congress reveals that 
these congressmen believed that they had far-reaching authority to 
both define rights protected by the Amendment and to enact legisla-
tion enforcing those rights.  Some feared that the Court might over-
rule their efforts, especially after the Court’s narrow reading of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the 
Slaughter-House Cases.21  However, the congressional debates reveal 
that those members of Congress saw the Court as a threat to their au-
tonomy, not as the proper authority to determine the meaning of the 
Reconstruction Amendments.22
By and large, the United States Supreme Court recognizes that 
Congress has a great amount of autonomy to enforce the political 
Thirteenth Amendment.  The Court has virtually never ruled on the 
meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment itself.  Instead, it has indirect-
ly interpreted the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment by inter-
preting statutes protecting rights based in that Amendment.
   
23  The 
Court has taken pains to make it clear that these cases are merely mat-
ters of statutory, not constitutional, interpretation.24  Congress has 
amended statutes based on the Thirteenth Amendment several times 
to correct what members of Congress believe to be unduly cramped 
Supreme Court interpretations.25
 
ment Act).  The Court upheld § 1985 as a valid use of the Section 2 power in United States 
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).   
  The Court has deferred to Con-
 21. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).  See James W. Fox, Jr., Re-readings and 
Misreadings: Slaughter-House, Privileges or Immunities, and Section Five Enforcement Power, 91 KY. 
L.J. 67, 155 (2002) (noting that the ruling in the Slaughter-House Cases eliminated discus-
sion of the “fundamental privileges of national citizenship” from congressional debates). 
 22. See ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY, supra note 8, at 60 (explaining that the Slaugh-
ter-House holding “rejected the broadest, natural rights theory of the privileges and immun-
ities of citizenship held by some Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
 23. See, e.g., Patterson v. McClean, 491 U.S. 164, 171 (1989) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981); United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988) (same); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 
U.S. 160 (1976) (same); Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1943) (interpreting the Anti-
Peonage Act). 
 24. See, e.g., Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 944. 
 25. For example, Congress amended the Anti-Peonage Act in 1948 to broaden the 
meaning of involuntary servitude in response to Supreme Court and lower court rulings 
narrowly interpreting the meaning of the anti-peonage statute.  See Zietlow, Free at Last!, 
supra note 3, at 300 (noting that Congress intended the 1948 amendments to make it “a 
crime to hold someone in a condition of involuntary servitude regardless of the existence 
of any debt.”).  Congress enacted the 1991 Civil Rights Act in part to correct the Court’s 
narrow reading of § 1981 in Patterson v. McClean.  Id. at 277.  The Court acknowledged as 
much and upheld the amendment in CBOCS W. Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 446–48 
(2008).  A provision of the 2000 Trafficking Victims Protection Act was intended to over-
rule the Court’s narrow interpretation of involuntariness in Kozminski.  Zietlow, Free at 
Last!, supra note 3, at 301. 
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gress’s authority to do so.26
Finally, the Court has adopted a highly deferential approach 
when evaluating the scope of Congress’s power to enforce the Thir-
teenth Amendment.  In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Court held 
that Congress’s Section 2 power extends to eliminating the badges 
and incidents of slavery, adopting language reminiscent of the con-
gressional debates over the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement 
power.
  The Court’s approach to interpreting the 
Thirteenth Amendment is thus highly deferential, reserving to Con-
gress the power to define the Amendment’s meaning.  
27  Thus, the Court adopted a “hands off” rational basis review 
of Congress’s authority to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.  In 
subsequent cases, the Court has retained that deferential approach.28
III.  DEBATE OVER THE BREADTH OF THE ENFORCEMENT POWER 
  
This is the proper approach for the Court to take toward the political 
Thirteenth Amendment. 
Since the Court largely cedes enforcement authority to Congress, 
the extent of the congressional enforcement power under Section 2 
of the Thirteenth Amendment is particularly significant.  Two articles 
in this symposium address the scope of the enforcement power.29  As 
Alex Tsesis points out, most scholars who have addressed the issue ar-
gue that Congress has broad authority to enforce the Amendment, 
and that courts should defer to that authority.30
 
 26. See, e.g., CBOCS W. Inc., 553 U.S. at 446–48 (finding that a provision of the 1991 
Civil Rights Act was intended to overrule its interpretation of § 1981 in Patterson v. McClean 
and upholding that provision). 
  Recently, however, 
Jennifer Mason McAward has called for the Court to adopt a more re-
 27. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).  The Court held that “Con-
gress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are 
the badges and incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into 
effective legislation.”  Id. 
 28. See, e.g., CBOCS W. Inc., 553 U.S. at 446–50 (describing the purpose of legislative 
amendments to §§ 1981–1982 and judicial interpretations of those amendments).   
 29. Compare Alexander Tsesis, Congressional Authority to Interpret the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, 71 MD. L. REV. 40 (2011) [hereinafter Tsesis, Congressional Authority] (arguing that 
courts should defer to the enforcement power) with Jennifer Mason McAward, Congression-
al Authority to Interpret the Thirteenth Amendment: A Response to Professor Tsesis, 71 MD. L. REV. 
60 (2011) [hereinafter McAward, A Response] (arguing that courts should impose limits on 
the enforcement power). 
 30. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801 (2010) (ar-
guing that the Reconstruction Amendments were drafted with the intention of granting 
Congress broad enforcement powers); Alexander Tsesis, Interpreting the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1337 (2009) (explaining how later Supreme Court interpreta-
tions limited the broad congressional enforcement power of Section 2 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment); Zietlow, Free at Last!, supra note 3 (same). 
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strictive approach to legislation enacted under Section 2.31  McAward 
argues that the Court should apply the same restrictive “congruence 
and proportionality” test that it adopted toward Congress’s power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment in City of Boerne v. Flores.32
Tsesis argues that the framers of the Thirteenth Amendment in-
tended the enforcement power to be broad, and that structural limi-
tations on congressional power do not justify judicial restrictions on 
that power.  Tsesis begins with the premise “that statements made in 
the immediate aftermath of the Thirteenth Amendment are best in-
dicative of the scope of the legislative power provided Congress under 
Section 2.”
  In 
their symposium pieces, Tsesis and McAward debate whether either 
the original meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment or principles of 
federalism and separation of powers justify such a restrictive approach 
toward Section 2.  At stake is whether the political branches will retain 
control over their power to enforce that Amendment. 
33  Most of these statements were made during the debate 
over the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which, as noted above, protects a broad 
spectrum of fundamental rights. This history supports Tsesis’s claim 
that members of the Reconstruction Congress believed that their 
power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment was extremely broad.34  
Moreover, the debates reveal that member of the Reconstruction 
Congress saw themselves, and not the courts, as the primary enforcers 
of the Amendment.35
However, the intent of the framers by itself is not determinative 
of the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment.  Principles of federal-
ism or separation of powers might justify restrictions on Section 2.  
Citing Boerne, McAward argues that principles of separation of powers 
counsel against Congress having the power to define the substantive 
meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment.
   
36
 
 31. Jennifer Mason McAward, The Scope of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment Enforcement 
Power After City of Boerne v. Flores, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 77, 130 (2010) [hereinafter McA-
ward, Enforcement Power After City of Boerne] (arguing that Congress’s Section 2 power “is 
best understood as a prophylactic power, and the concept of the ‘badges and incidents of 
slavery’ is best understood as referring to a defined set of practices associated with slavery 
and postemancipation attempts at de facto reenslavement”). 
  She claims that the 
 32. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  McAward, Enforcement Power After City of Boerne, supra note 
31, at 136–41. 
 33. Tsesis, Congressional Authority, supra note 29, at 41. 
 34. See id. at 43–47 (describing the statements of congressmen during the Thirteenth 
Amendment debates). 
 35. See Zietlow, Free at Last!, supra note 3, at 275–77 (describing Senator Trumbull’s 
beliefs that in spite of the Dred Scott ruling Congress still maintained broad enforcement 
power under the Reconstruction Amendments). 
 36. McAward, A Response, supra note 29, at 75. 
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Court’s deferential approach in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. poses the 
danger that Section 2 could become a general police power in the un-
fettered hands of Congress.37  According to McAward, the Court 
should intervene to protect states from the resulting intrusion on 
their sovereignty.38  Tsesis discounts those concerns, and points out 
that the Reconstruction Amendments altered our structure of federal-
ism to create a federal source of individual rights.39
As Tsesis points out, the Court has shown no indication that it in-
tends to restrict the Section 2 enforcement power.
 
40  Indeed, in its 
rulings evaluating Congress’s power to enforce the Thirteenth 
Amendment since Boerne, the Court has remained highly deferential 
to that power.41  There also appears to be no need for the Court to 
change its approach.  To some extent, McAward’s thesis is a solution 
in search of a problem.  While it is true that some scholars have made 
far-reaching claims about the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
Congress has shown no inclination to follow that lead.  In fact, Con-
gress has rarely used the Section 2 enforcement power, and when it 
has done so, it has used the power to remedy conduct that clearly falls 
within the definition of slavery, involuntary servitude, or the badges 
and incidents of slavery.42
Jim Pope claims that “the Thirteenth Amendment directly com-
mands the government to undertake a project of social transforma-
tion.”
  The political limits on Congress’s power to 
enforce the Thirteenth Amendment seem to be working quite well, 
perhaps too well.   
43
 
 37. Id. at 77–78 (“Jones put its imprimatur on a power of near-plenary proportions that 
could permit Congress to attack any form of discrimination against any group.”). 
  As early as The Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court agreed, 
 38. Id. at 78 (“This conception of the Section 2 power carries substantial federalism 
costs.”). 
 39. See Tsesis, Congressional Authority, supra note 29, at 46 (“The breadth of power Con-
gress defined for itself through the Civil Rights Act of 1866 unequivocally signaled the cre-
ation of congressional supremacy power over matters involving the protection of human 
rights.”). 
 40. Id. at 53. 
 41. See CBOCS W. Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 446–48 (2008) (discussing prior 
interpretations of the Civil Rights Act of 1991); United States v. Marcus, 487 F. Supp. 2d 
289, 313 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing congressional authority to enact the Trafficking Vic-
tims Protection Act), vacated on ex post facto grounds, 538 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d and 
remanded on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 2159 (2010); United States v. Bradley, 390 F.3d 145, 
152–54 (1st Cir. 2004) (same), vacated on other grounds, 545 U.S. 1101 (2005) (per curiam).  
 42. McAward acknowledges as much in her other work.  McAward, Enforcement Power 
After City of Boerne, supra note 30, at 89. 
 43. See James Gray Pope, What’s Different About the Thirteenth Amendment, and Why Does it 
Matter?, 71 MD. L. REV. 189, 194 (2011) (explaining how explicitly banning slavery and in-
voluntary servitude transformed society). 
ZietlowFinalBookProof 12/8/2011  2:00 PM 
290 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:283 
pointing out that the Thirteenth Amendment has an affirmative na-
ture that includes a promise of substantive freedom for people within 
Congress’s jurisdiction.44  After a flurry of Reconstruction Era civil 
rights legislation, Congress waited a century to enact the only other 
civil rights act based on the Thirteenth Amendment, portions of the 
1968 Fair Housing Act.45  Thus, Congress has rarely used its Section 2 
power to address the badges and incidents of slavery.  Congress has 
been even more reluctant to use the Section 2 power to protect the 
rights of workers under the slavery and involuntary servitude clauses.  
The Court has suggested that ending involuntary servitude would en-
tail “maintain[ing] a system of completely free and voluntary labor 
throughout the United States.”46  Yet Congress has done remarkably 
little to protect low wage workers who lack the “power below” to work 
in a truly free workplace,47 even though real wages have declined 
dramatically concomitantly with the decline in the right of workers to 
organize and bargain collectively.48
Given Congress’s failure to truly enforce the Thirteenth 
Amendment, Court-based restrictions on the Section 2 power would 
arguably be superfluous.  The real problem is congressional reluc-
tance to use that power to protect the rights of workers and racial mi-
norities.  Addressing that reluctance is not a matter of constitutional 
law, but of constitutional politics. 
   
IV.  THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT IN POLITICS 
In their articles, Linda McClain and Ken Kersch talk about the 
role that the Thirteenth Amendment has played in politics.  Their 
pieces reveal that the constitutional politics of the Thirteenth 
Amendment is more complex than one might first expect.  Activists 
 
 44. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (“[T]he Thirteenth Amendment 
may be regarded as nullifying all State laws which establish or uphold slavery. . . .  [I]t is 
assumed, that the power vested in Congress to enforce the article by appropriate legisla-
tion, clothes Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all 
badges and incidents of slavery . . . .”). 
 45. Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, Title VIII, April 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 81 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq.).  The Hate Crimes Act and the Anti-Blockbusting por-
tions of the Act were based in the Thirteenth Amendment.   
 46. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944). 
 47. Pope, supra note 43, at 194. 
 48. See generally Nicole M. Fortin & Thomas Lemieux, Institutional Changes and Rising 
Wage Inequality, Is There a Linkage?, 11 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 75 (1997) (ascertaining a 
possible linkage between a decrease in unionization and a decrease in real wages).   
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on both sides of the political spectrum have claimed the Thirteenth 
Amendment as their own.49
Most accounts of the 1964 Civil Rights Act as constitutional poli-
tics discuss Congress’s reliance on the Commerce Clause and the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
  
50  Title II of the 
1964 Act outlawed race-based discrimination in places of public ac-
commodation.51  In her article, McClain points out that both sides of 
the debate over Title II cited the Thirteenth Amendment in support 
of their claim.52  A few proponents of the Act claimed that it fell with-
in the power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment be-
cause race discrimination in places of public accommodation 
amounts to a badge or incident of slavery.53  McClain reports that dur-
ing his testimony before Congress, then-Attorney General Robert F. 
Kennedy opined that the Thirteenth Amendment would provide a 
foundation for Title II.54  Kennedy argued that private discrimination 
was a badge or incident of slavery, and pointed out the advantage of 
the Thirteenth Amendment over the Fourteenth—that it lacked a 
state action requirement and could clearly be used to remedy private 
discrimination.55
Notwithstanding the urging of the Department of Justice, few 
members of Congress even acknowledged the argument that Title II 
could be justified under Congress’s power to enforce the Thirteenth 
Amendment.
   
56
 
 49. For example, activists on both sides of the debate over the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
invoked the Thirteenth Amendment in support of their arguments.  See infra note 
  It would be interesting to know why that argument 
52 (de-
scribing the arguments on both sides of Title II).  More recently, right wing activists claim 
that the Thirteenth Amendment protects their libertarian positions.  See text accompany-
ing infra note 65 (describing libertarian views on the Thirteenth Amendment).  
 50. See, e.g., Rebecca E. Zietlow, To Secure These Rights: Congress, Courts and the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 945 (2005) [hereinafter Zietlow, To Secure These Rights] (de-
scribing the debates surrounding the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 51. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, July 2, 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (1994)). 
 52. See Linda C. McClain, Involuntary Servitude, Public Accommodations Laws, and the Leg-
acy of Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 71 MD. L. REV. 83, 123–42 (2011) (de-
scribing the arguments of both proponents and opponents of Title II based on the Thir-
teenth Amendment). 
 53. Id. at 126. 
 54. See id. at 125–26 (citing Hearings Before the Senate Committee on S. 1732 A Bill to 
Eliminate Discrimination in Public Accommodations Affecting Interstate Commerce, 88th 
Cong., 1st Sess., July 1–3, 8–9, 12–18, 22, 1963, at 28 (statement of the Hon. Robert F. 
Kennedy, Attorney General of the United States)). 
 55. Id.  Kennedy’s assistant, Deputy Attorney General Burke Marshall, sounded the 
same theme in his testimony before the Senate.  Id. at 127–28. 
 56. Id. at 130 (citing Individual Views of Senator Winston L. Prouty, S. Rep. No. 88-872, 
Part 2, at 1–4). 
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was not taken up by more supporters of the Act.  After all, the 1866 
Civil Rights Act, which also outlawed private race discrimination in 
the market, was based on Section 2.57  Moreover, only four years after 
the passage of the 1964 Act, members of Congress invoked the Thir-
teenth Amendment to support the 1968 Fair Housing Act.58  None-
theless, in 1964, the Thirteenth Amendment’s promise of substantive 
freedom was eclipsed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of 
equality, and the pragmatic call of the Commerce Clause.59
Ironically, by far the more salient Thirteenth Amendment-based 
arguments in the debate over the 1964 Civil Rights Act were those 
made not in support of, but in opposition to, the Act.  Both Moreton 
Rolleston, the owner of the Heart of Atlanta Motel, and Senator 
Strom Thurmond, a chief congressional opponent of the Act, argued 
that the bill would impose involuntary servitude on property owners 
by requiring them to serve black customers.
   
60  Although McClain cor-
rectly characterizes this argument as one that would have confused 
even Alice in Wonderland,61 it does highlight the libertarian potential 
of the Amendment’s promise of freedom.  After all, as Jim Pope 
points out, the Thirteenth Amendment is arguably the only constitu-
tional provision that mandates “the official identification and en-
forcement of unenumerated rights.”62  Many of the framers of the 
Thirteenth Amendment believed in a wide range of natural rights, 
and believed that all free persons were entitled to those rights which 
include a certain level of individual autonomy.63
 
 57. See Zietlow, Free at Last!, supra note 
 As McClain points 
out, the argument that the protected autonomy includes the right to 
discriminate based on race strains credulity given that the primary 
purpose of the Amendment was to wipe out slavery and the depriva-
tion of fundamental human rights that the institution entailed.  Both 
3, at 275–81 (“The Reconstruction Congress 
relied on the Thirteenth Amendment to enact legislation to end the subordination that 
resulted from the racially-based denial of fundamental rights and the brutal economic ex-
ploitation of slavery.”  Id. at 279). 
 58. Id. at 301–06. 
 59. See McClain, supra note 52, at 135–37; Zietlow, To Secure These Rights, supra note 50, 
at 977–78. 
 60. See McClain, supra note 52, at 137–38. 
 61. Id. at 93. 
 62. See Pope, supra note 43, at 190. 
 63. See ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM: A 
LEGAL HISTORY 103 (2004) (“They [the framers] regarded the Thirteenth Amendment as 
a means of restoring the natural rights long denied to both blacks and wage earners.”); see 
generally Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Ideological Origins of the Thirteenth Amendment (unpublished 
manuscript on file with the author). 
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the members Congress and the courts who heard the argument 
agreed.64
Nonetheless, as Ken Kersch reminds us, the libertarian side of 
the Thirteenth Amendment continues to attract conservative ideolo-
gues in this country.
   
65  Kersch describes the contemporary conserva-
tive movement of Declarationism, which champions both the Declara-
tion of Independence and the ideology of Abraham Lincoln and the 
Reconstruction Republicans in support of a conservative agenda.66  
Ironically, participants in the Declarationist movement rely upon the 
natural law ideology behind the Declaration and Reconstruction 
measures, including the Thirteenth Amendment, as a means of re-
deeming the South from the taint of slavery.67
Kersch reminds us that the political Thirteenth Amendment is 
open to a variety of interpretations depending on the political goals 
of those interpreting the Amendment.  Thus, labor leaders in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century argued that the Thirteenth 
Amendment protected a fundamental right to organize and to 
strike.
   
68
Of course, the political advocates will be more likely to succeed if 
their interpretation is consistent with the original meaning of the 
Thirteenth Amendment.  Thus, labor’s theory of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, while never embraced by the framers of that Amend-
ment, is arguably consistent with the Amendment’s original goal to 
create a free labor force in which workers were not subject to undue 
coercion.  Labor advocates succeeded in convincing Congress to 
adopt the National Labor Relations Act, which protected their free-
  Segregationists in the mid-twentieth century argued that an-
tidiscrimination laws violated the Thirteenth Amendment by impos-
ing involuntary servitude upon them.  The validity of these interpreta-
tions depends in part on the extent to which they coincide with the 
original meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment.  However, given the 
wide range of meaning that can be attributed to that Amendment, the 
extent to which the Thirteenth Amendment protects those rights de-
pends ultimately upon constitutional politics—the extent to which the 
political movements championing those interpretations succeed in 
convincing courts and lawmakers to adopt their approach.   
 
 64. See McClain, supra note 52, at 149. 
 65. See Ken I. Kersch, Beyond Originalism: Conservative Declarationism and Constitutional 
Redemption, 71 MD. L. REV. 229, 229 (2011). 
 66. Id. at 230–33. 
 67. Id. at 249–50. 
 68. James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 942, 959 (1997).  
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dom to organize and to strike.69
V.  CONCLUSION 
  By contrast, the argument that sta-
tutes prohibiting race discrimination impose involuntary servitude 
upon racists flies in the face of the framers’ use of the Thirteenth 
Amendment enforcement power to end race discrimination in private 
contracts.  Thus, the segregationists’ invocation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment failed, and barely registered amongst the members of 
Congress and the Court to whom it was addressed.  The success and 
failure of the two movements suggests that even in constitutional poli-
tics, original meaning is relevant.  These two examples suggest that 
legal arguments are simply more persuasive when they have support 
in original meaning, even when they are made not in courtrooms but 
in the realm of constitutional politics.  
The political Thirteenth Amendment reminds us about the im-
portance of constitutional politics to the development of constitu-
tional law.  Although the Court has done little to develop the mean-
ing of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Amendment has played an 
important role in constitutional politics at key moments during our 
history.  The Thirteenth Amendment remains relevant because its 
promise of freedom and fundamental rights is so compelling.  There-
fore, the political Thirteenth Amendment will always remain within 
our national constitutional consciousness. 
 
 69. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY, supra note 8, at 85–86. 
